We can prosecute Martin Romualdez. What stops us from producing another one?

There is an understandable satisfaction in watching a powerful politician finally face the possibility of consequences.

Martin Romualdez was Speaker of the House, cousin of the President and one of the most powerful men in the country. Now he is facing a ₱7.44-billion plunder case over alleged kickbacks from flood-control and other government projects. He denies wrongdoing and remains presumed innocent unless prosecutors prove their case in court.

If they do, Romualdez should be held accountable. But there is a danger in allowing the story to end there.

For as long as many of us can remember, this has been the familiar rhythm of Philippine politics. Find the people who stole. Investigate them. Prosecute them. Celebrate plunder charges as proof that accountability has finally arrived. Then watch the cases drag on for years, defendants walk free, political fortunes recover, and another administration discover another corruption scandal involving another set of powerful names.

Then we do it all over again.

This is why the flood-control scandal cannot simply become a story about finding the latest villains. Prosecuting people who stole from government is necessary, but prosecution happens after the system has already failed. The more important question is why the opportunities for corruption keep surviving the people accused of exploiting them.

Consider what prosecutors themselves allege in the Romualdez case. The supposed ₱7.44 billion did not emerge from one transaction. The Ombudsman alleges that Romualdez and his co-accused received commissions, shares, kickbacks and other benefits on at least 15 occasions from contractors and entities with interests in government projects funded from 2022 to 2025.

If those allegations are proven, we should ask more than how one politician could allegedly accumulate that much money. We should ask how government could have accommodated it repeatedly.

Public money does not move by itself. Infrastructure projects have to be proposed, funded, procured, awarded, implemented and inspected. Contractors participate. Officials sign documents. Congress appropriates money. Executive agencies spend it. Auditors and oversight institutions are supposed to notice when something goes wrong.

A scheme involving billions therefore requires us to examine not only the people accused of exploiting government, but the weaknesses in government that made exploitation possible.

That is the question that survives Martin Romualdez.